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 Summary
South Asia is home to nearly a quarter of the world’s population and is a region 
of dynamic economic growth, yet it performs relatively poorly on health 
and nutrition indicators. As a potential route towards addressing this poor 
performance, a range of accountability initiatives has been implemented to 
improve service delivery in the health and nutrition sectors. These initiatives 
can be categorised as techno-managerial, transparency oriented, participatory, 
and collective or social accountability (based on the typology developed by Joshi 
and Houtzager 2012). This is a rich and vibrant field, with a great deal to offer 
in terms of best practice; but there is little work that focuses on South Asian 
innovation and practice generally, and takes a comparative and theoretical 
perspective to ground existing and future accountability initiatives in health and 
nutrition specifically.
The project synthesised in this report started from the overall premise that 
studies of accountability initiatives should be rooted in an understanding that the 
state is not distinct from society but is embedded in prevailing power dynamics 
and social relations. We therefore looked to the existing critical accountability 
literature to understand the socio-political processes within which different 
types of accountability initiatives and movements emerge, are shaped, unfold and 
influence socio-political change. 
The report first summarises current concepts and issues in accountability 
thinking and practice,  focusing on practices commonly referred to as ‘social 
accountability’. It goes on to contrast these with the ‘standard model’ of political 
and administrative accountability, which is prevalent in the literature, and points 
to ways in which reality often deviates from this standard model.
Against this general conceptual and theoretical backdrop, the report examines 
health systems in South Asia in the light of assumptions underpinning the 
standard model of accountability. Viewed from this perspective, these health 
systems face considerable accountability challenges and gaps, some of which are 
now being addressed using social accountability approaches.
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We then identify a series of contemporary critical issues arising in social 
accountability literature and practice. Some of these came to light in recent 
studies seeking to ascertain the factors that influence the effectiveness and 
impact of these approaches, and offer useful pointers for how to design and 
implement initiatives for maximum impact. Others have been on the agenda for 
some time, and include the importance of context (particularly socio-political 
context) in shaping accountability initiatives and how they unfold. They also 
include clientelist or patronage political cultures, which pose particular challenges 
for social accountability as they do for bureaucratic and political accountability 
– but which nevertheless operate according to their own logics and rationality, 
which researchers and practitioners must seek to understand.
Having identified key issues and lessons from the global literature on social 
accountability, the report sketches some of the accountability issues facing the health 
and nutrition sectors in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, before homing in on social 
accountability practice in the three countries. We present findings from a more focused 
review of academic and ‘grey’ literature on health and nutrition accountability initiatives 
in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, followed by a summary of an online consultation 
with practitioners involved in these fields in each country, alongside two case studies.
Overall findings are then summarised to reflect the structure of our conceptual 
review, which, for pragmatic purposes, we narrow down to the micro-level 
political processes at play within community-based interventions and actions. 
This proves useful in drawing out some of the key considerations for the design 
and analysis of such programmes. The framework highlights four factors:
• the need to understand community heterogeneity (rather than assuming 
homogeneity, as many interventions do); 
• the role of community collective action and/or its role in coercion or ‘noisy 
protest’ in effecting change; 
• the ways in which cooperation, capacity and commitment affect the 
community and frontline provider relationship, and the ability and willingness 
to deliver to meet demands; 
• the ways in which clientelism and other such extant local political structures 
form the backdrop against which accountability actions play out.
About this report: background 
 and objectives
South Asia is home to nearly a quarter of the 
world’s population and is a region of dynamic 
economic growth, yet it performs relatively poorly 
on health and nutrition indicators. A range of 
accountability initiatives has been implemented to 
improve service delivery in the health and nutrition 
sectors. These initiatives can be categorised 
as techno-managerial, transparency oriented, 
participatory, and collective or social accountability 
initiatives (based on the typology developed by 
Joshi and Houtzager 2012). This is a rich and 
vibrant field, with a great deal to offer in terms 
of best practice. However, there is as yet little 
work that focuses on South Asian innovation and 
practice, and takes a comparative and theoretical 
perspective to ground existing and future 
accountability initiatives in health and nutrition 
specifically.
This report presents the synthesised findings of 
a research project1 that aims to fill this gap by 
addressing the following questions: 
• What are the salient theoretical developments 
in the field of social accountability and how 
are they relevant to the pursuit of improved 
accountability and outcomes in the delivery of 
health and nutrition services in South Asia? 
• What can be learnt from comparing current 
practices in the field, drawing on the literature 
and the experience of practitioners at the 
cutting edge of accountability work? 
We intend the report to be useful principally to 
scholars and practitioners of health and nutrition 
in South Asia who encounter challenges around 
weak accountability and poor governance. It 
should help them relate their experiences – of 
accountability challenges in service delivery 
and innovative practical responses to those 
challenges – to current scholarship and practice 
in the thematically broader field of transparency 
and accountability at the global level. We hope 
this will enable them to learn from this broader 
field and use developments therein to address the 
challenges they encounter and refine their own 
practices and responses, all with a view to making 
health and nutrition service delivery more effective 
and accountable. 
We began by reviewing the general social 
accountability literature and that pertaining to 
the health sector (section 1). We then conducted 
a more focused review of academic and ‘grey’ 
literature on health and nutrition accountability 
initiatives in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan 
(section 2).2 Because the scope of such a review 
is limited to what has been documented and 
published, this was complemented with an online 
consultation intended to capture some of the 
undocumented cutting edge thinking and practice 
from the field, engaging a range of participants 
through a variety of methods (section 3).3 Finally, 
two case studies were commissioned (involving 
purposively selected accountability initiatives in 
the countries of interest) to provide more insights 
into how accountability initiatives operate at 
multiple levels, both within local communities and 
at interfaces between communities and the state 
(section 4). 
1  The full report on the research project is available online at www.transformnutrition.org/2017/03/accountability-in-health-
and-nutrition-in-south-asia/
2  Twenty nine studies focusing on the health and nutrition sectors were identified following an abstract review process. 
Following an in-depth text review of a subset, and narrowing down on cases from the three countries involved, 26 studies were 
finally selected according to the following criteria: an evidence-based approach (i.e. some basic description of qualitative or 
quantitative methodology pursued); a focus on health and/or nutrition and relevant determinants such as sanitation; and a 
specific focus on community-based accountability.
3 Participants in the online consultation were selected via several means: membership of the partner network of Community of 
Practitioners on Accountability and Social Action in Health (COPASAH); mention in the published and grey literature reviewed 
above; other local partners or recommended participants; and ‘snowballed’ invitations. The consultation, hosted on the Eldis 
community discussion platform, was eventually attended by 49 participants from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the UK, the USA 
and the Netherlands. The discussion took place on 16 and 17 March 2016. Active posts were received by 31 participants (out of 
which five were from the organising team) over the two days of discussion, for a total of 134 contributions.
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1. Conceptual and practical 
review of relevant lessons from 
the literature
Accountability initiatives in health and nutrition, 
whether led by citizens’ groups, community 
members or non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), have been associated with significant 
improvements in health and nutrition outcomes 
when applied to relevant services. Such initiatives 
are increasingly diverse, both within and beyond 
the health and nutrition sectors. 
Definitions of the different ways of claiming and 
securing accountability have likewise expanded. 
One prominent review defines social accountability 
as ‘the ongoing and collective effort to hold public 
officials to account for the provision of public goods 
which are existing state obligations’ (Houtzager 
and Joshi 2008: 3, cited in Joshi and Houtzager 
2012: 152). The authors place accountability 
initiatives within a wider context of the failure 
of traditional models of political accountability 
and poor service provision and outcomes for 
poor people. A wider definition of ‘transparency 
and accountability initiatives’ follows from this 
definition, and considers ‘demand-side’ initiatives 
[which] are led by citizens and social actors who 
engage with more powerful actors… across a range 
of interfaces, which are social rather than political, 
institutional or bureaucratic’ (Gaventa and McGee 
2013: s4). 
Further directions, discussions and divisions in the 
literature exist (see Box 1 on page 8). Essentially, 
however, scholars agree that accountability is 
about ‘calling to account’ (Bovens 2007; Bovens, 
Schillemans and Goodin 2014; Lindberg 2013; 
Mulgan 2000). When applied in the development 
literature, the prefixes ‘social’, ‘community’, 
‘political’ and ‘administrative’ describe the means 
of engaging such processes of calling to account, 
and/or the locus of their activities (e.g. social, 
community, political or bureaucratic processes 
and contexts). 
Our review looked specifically at these calling 
to account processes in the case of health and 
nutrition services and outcomes for poor people 
in low- and middle-income countries, focusing 
on India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. It considered 
processes and interventions that are conceived 
and implemented at the front line or interface 
between people and services (or in the absence of 
such services). Focusing primarily on processes 
originating in communities or local political 
processes, the review followed the approach 
developed by Joshi and Houtzager (2012), which 
locates the background and origins of such 
activities in the limitations of existing political 
and administrative systems. We also started from 
their premise that to understand accountability 
issues from the perspective of poor people it is 
important to look across the full range of calling to 
account processes (political, administrative, social, 
etc.) available to them, as well as to explore how 
these are interrelated and identify where and why 
they succeed or fail. Nonetheless, as our focus is 
on accountability-seeking processes originating 
in communities or at local interfaces between 
community members and political processes – 
loosely referred to as ‘social accountability’ – we 
start by setting out some definitions (Box 1).
1.1 The ‘standard model’ of 
political and administrative 
accountability
Accountability is both a central ideal of representative 
democracy and a crucial process in the democratic 
system. According to this concept, citizens – 
the ‘principals’ in a democracy – delegate their 
sovereignty to representatives or ‘agents’ to govern 
on their behalf and can call such agents to account 
regarding their use of public power (Bovens 2007). 
In terms of process, accountability in a representative 
democracy can be conceived of as a chain of 
principal–agent relationships in which power is 
delegated from voter to representative, representative 
to minister, and minister to civil servants and 
bureaucrats; whereas accountability works in the 
reverse direction – representatives are accountable 
to voters, and civil servants and bureaucrats are 
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accountable to representatives (Bovens 2007; Mulgan 
2000). These two systems of accountability – political 
and administrative respectively – constitute the 
standard model of accountability in a representative 
democracy (Joshi and Houtzager 2012). 
In the standard model, the roles of voter-citizens, 
politician-representatives and bureaucrats are 
assumed to be fairly distinct: voters elect politicians 
based on their political manifestos; elected 
politicians make policy; and bureaucrats design 
and implement programmes based on that policy. 
In the wider policy process there may be further 
interactions when citizens lobby to get issues onto 
the policy agenda (see Schmitter 2004, cited in 
Joshi and Houtzager 2012: 148). 
However, in many democracies, voters, politicians 
and bureaucrats have significantly reshaped and 
blurred the distinctions between their assumed 
roles within the standard model, redefining 
democratic accountability in the process. This 
happens in many ways, some of which serve to 
enhance state accountability to citizens. One 
prevalent way in which this happens (which does 
not enhance accountability to all citizens equitably) 
is ‘clientelistic’ or ‘patronage’ politics, in which 
voters give political support for individual material 
gain, politicians distribute state resources among 
their supporters, and bureaucrats operate not on 
the basis of rules and regulations but in response 
to (often highly localised) social and political 
demands. 
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Box 1: Defining social accountability – orientation, scope, 
directionality, leadership, process and outcomes
Social accountability is a contested concept and there is little consensus in the literature about what it 
means. This is largely because social accountability initiatives (SAIs) represent a wide range of actions 
that vary in key aspects, as follows. 
• Ideological orientation: Some SAIs such as citizen charters and complaint hotlines are ideologically 
rooted in new public management and attempt to change accountability relations by framing 
citizens as users and consumers (Joshi and Houtzager 2012). Those that emphasise citizen 
participation in policy-making and service delivery (such as advisory/consultative groups and user 
committees respectively) emerge from the ‘deepening democracy’ school (Gaventa and McGee 2013). 
• Scope: Joshi (2008) argues for an analytical distinction between SAIs that involve citizen participation 
in governance and those that focus on monitoring and evaluating the use of public authority. The 
latter, she contends, perform better than the former, which raises concerns about co-option by the 
state. Malena and McNeil (2010), on the other hand, contend that mechanisms in which ordinary 
citizens are involved in decision-making are a new generation of ‘social accountability practices’.
• Direction of control: Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006) characterise social accountability as a 
non-electoral vertical accountability mechanism that can activate the operation of horizontal 
accountability mechanisms. Horizontal mechanisms represent the conventional internal systems of 
government accountability – legal, fiscal, administrative and political – whereas vertical mechanisms 
represent more ‘bottom-up’ external checks by non-state actors (i.e. citizens) (Bukenya, Hickey 
and King 2012). Goetz and Jenkins (2001), on the other hand, describe conditions when social 
accountability can also be diagonal – i.e. when vertical accountability activities engage with 
horizontal mechanisms, such as in participatory budgeting. 
• Leadership: SAIs are, by definition, citizen-led, but can become state-led when institutionalised by 
the state (Malena and McNeil 2010). 
• Process: Some SAIs (such as community monitoring, social audits, public demonstrations, protests, 
advocacy campaigns and public interest litigations) tend to be confrontational, whereas others 
(such as participatory budgeting and citizen scorecards) tend to be more collaborative in their 
approach to the state (Joshi and Houtzager 2012). 
• Outcomes: Whereas some SAIs aim to improve service delivery, others focus on empowering the 
citizen vis-à-vis the state, and others still focus on deepening the democratic process and system 
(Gaventa and McGee 2013). 
1.2 Health systems in South 
Asia and the ‘standard model’ 
of accountability
The three countries chosen for this study share 
a common political past until independence from 
colonial rule in 1947; and, in the case of Bangladesh, 
independence from Pakistan, in 1971. Some of the 
problems they face are common to all post-colonial 
contexts while others are specific to the region, 
reflecting broader issues such as governance failures, 
accountability deficits and failures to implement 
adequate service delivery. The three states also face 
their own specific challenges in terms of equitable 
health and nutrition service delivery. 
Despite these similarities, the three states have taken 
divergent paths in terms of governance, development 
and, consequently, health systems. Implementation 
of their chosen health system has been determined 
by contextual factors such as population size, 
geography and centre–state relations, thus rendering 
these ‘analogous’ states (Jalal 1995: 4) useful cases 
for comparison. Relations between the state and 
citizens and communities in all three countries also 
differ along the axes of class, community and caste 
(Ibid.), and this is strongly linked to the political 
trajectory undertaken by each state. 
Broad indicators of health outcomes and access have 
shown some moderate improvement (e.g. maternal 
mortality in Pakistan; see Nishtar, Boerma, Amjad, 
Alam, Khalid, Ul Haq and Mirza 2013) or even 
substantial improvement (e.g. infant, child and 
maternal mortality in Bangladesh; see Chowdhury, 
Bhuiya, Chowdhury, Rasheed, Hussain and Chen 
2013) but are generally still poor by international 
comparison (Figure 1). Indicators of health systems 
and outputs are also poor (Table 1), with recent 
analyses citing poor governance as a reason, 
including endemic corruption and accountability 
gaps (e.g. Nishtar et al. 2013: 2198–2200). A recent 
paper on South Asia highlighted ‘bad governance, 
inadequate monitoring, weaker health institutions, 
and poor accountability … as factors inhibiting 
progress [on child and maternal health and nutrition] 
in the region’ (Rajan, Gangbar and Gayithri 2014). 
Bangladesh is the youngest independent 
country and the smallest of the three in terms 
of size and population, though the largest in 
terms of population density. While its process of 
democratisation has been disrupted by military 
coups and routine periods of authoritarianism, it 
has a vibrant, wide-reaching and influential civil 
society (particularly in health and education) and 
an activist judiciary comparable with India’s.
In Pakistan – the least densely populated of the 
three states – similar drives of militarisation and 
authoritarianism have affected the state’s political 
trajectory and its relation with citizens. The 
government mandated a process of devolution in 
9
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Table 1 Health system indicators and health outputs in Bangladesh and neighbouring countries 
and regions
EPI= expanded programme of immunisation. GDP= gross domestic product. NA=not available.
Source: Chowdhury et al. 2013
Health systems Health outputs
Health 
expenditure 
(% of GDP)
Public 
expenditure 
in health
(% of total 
health 
expenditure)
Per head 
health 
expenditure 
(US$)
Doctors 
(per 1,000 
population)
Nurses 
(per 1,000 
population)
EPI (%) Diarrhoeal 
episodes 
that 
receive oral 
rehydration 
therapy (%)
Skilled 
attendance 
at delivery 
(%)
Facility 
delivery 
(%)
South Asia
Bangladesh 3·7 36·6 27 0·3 0·3 82·0 83·4 31·7 26·9
Pakistan 2·5 27·0 30 0·8 0·5 47·3 48·0 42·1 37·4
Nepal 5·4 39·3 33 0·2 0· 5 82·8 40·7 49.0 40·6
India 3·9 31·0 59 0·6 1·3 44·0 61·2 48·9 40·4
West Bengal NA NA NA NA NA 64·0 69·4 60·2 42·0
South East Asia
Cambodia 5·7 22·4 51 0·2 0·9 78·0 58·4 75·1 61·8
Laos 2·8 49·0 37 0·4 1·0 NA NA 41·5 37·5
Burma 2·0 13·0 23 0·4 1·0 NA NA 63·9 NA
services such as health care and education in 2000 
that followed the Indian three-tier model. However, 
while SAIs – prolific in the shape of community 
meetings and public hearings – have played a key 
role in India at the grassroots level, and have also 
been used in Bangladesh, they are largely absent 
from the literature on service delivery in Pakistan. 
Finally, India – the largest of the three countries 
in terms of population, size and gross domestic 
product (GDP) – is characterised by a highly 
heterogenous population (in terms of social, 
cultural and economic factors) and complex 
relations between central and state party politics. 
While divisions drawn based on judgements on the 
‘standard’ or ‘quality’ of democracy between the 
three states can ring hollow and reductive (Jalal 
1995), the nature of political processes between the 
centre and state in each country varies according to 
the different path each has taken. The case studies 
(section 4), drawn from India and Bangladesh, 
illustrate how differing political contexts have 
shaped both formal service delivery and community 
movements, particularly in health care and nutrition. 
Table 1 illustrates comparisons between the three 
countries with data on health system indicators and 
outputs for South Asia and South East Asia. 
In the light of even these very brief contextual 
sketches, it is easy to foresee obstacles to 
addressing poor health and nutrition performance 
and inequities under the ‘standard model’ of 
accountability. Standard governance models work 
on the assumption that representative democratic 
systems will direct resources towards pressing health 
problems and that where such systems fail, citizens 
or service users as ‘principals’ can engage with the 
system via their ‘agents’ (local leaders, politicians, 
etc.) as described earlier. However, in both the 
regional and global literature, a great deal has been 
written about the need for political will (Rajan et al. 
2014), commitment (Heaver 2005) and attention 
(Shiffman and Smith 2007; Shiffman 2010, 2016) in 
order for pressing health issues to become a policy 
focus. Without these, many health issues remain both 
invisible (to the political system or to communities 
themselves) and ignored within the standard model. 
Even where policy attention has been directed to 
specific health problems, without further political 
attention, the system bears a huge risk of rent-
seeking individuals overriding any public good. Rajan 
and colleagues, for example, comment on the way in 
which India’s community-level nutrition delivery (the 
Integrated Child Development Services) ‘has continued 
to emphasize … political returns over beneficiary 
impact’ (Rajan et al. 2014: 6). However, this does 
not have to be so: conversely, ‘Sri Lanka has been 
able to create a political environment where beneficiary 
improvement breeds political returns … the result 
of bottom-up demand for quality service provision and 
top-down accountability for effective implementation’ 
(Ibid.). This is reflected in significantly better 
health indicators (as shown in Figure 1). Such calls for 
greater accountability and transparency are repeated 
in other reviews of health systems in the region (Nishtar 
et al. 2013: 2199), but have yet to be realised. 
10
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Figure 1 Selected health indicators in South Asia and China
Source: Authors, using data from WHO 2016
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(per 10,000 
population)
Prevalence of stunting 
in children under five 
(%)
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1.3 Social accountability 
initiatives addressing failures 
in the ‘standard model’
SAIs have emerged as a specific response to 
the failure of the more traditional mechanisms 
of political and bureaucratic accountability in 
holding the state to account (Gaventa and McGee 
2013; Joshi and Houtzager 2012; Peruzzotti and 
Smulovitz 2006). In particular, they have been 
highlighted as an effective way to redress the 
grievances of poor people in developing country 
contexts, where transparency, accountability and 
participation are limited, if not lacking altogether. 
Joshi and Houtzager have noted that SAIs, while 
often bracketed together, emerge from distinct 
traditions (2012: 149; see also Box 1). One stream 
reflects a managerialist and World Bank-driven agenda, 
emerging from a wider concern in the ‘new public 
management’ literature with governance (over 
politics). This supports a view of citizens as exercising 
rational choice over the services they receive, and is 
an explicit extension of the principal–agent approach 
to accountability described earlier, rather than an 
alternative as such. Another stream characterises 
wider developments within right to information and 
broader transparency movements (see also Gaventa 
and McGee 2013). Finally, a third stream includes 
activities associated with participatory or ‘deepening’ 
democracy and the issue of basic rights to services 
(Joshi and Houtzager 2012: 150; Gaventa and McGee 
2013: s5-s7). 
The distinct traditions outlined above can also be 
traced in accountability initiatives in the health and 
nutrition sectors, notwithstanding differences in the 
origins of specific initiatives. Some have emerged as 
governance-focused interventions (primarily externally 
driven or conceived) or as field trials drawing on 
the World Bank conception (McCoy, Hall and Ridge 
2012: 251). Others form part of health-centred 
claims to the right to information, focusing on 
health budgeting (for instance). Others still arise in 
the context of either external or more organic, 
endogenous movements focused on participation 
and rights (George, Scott, Garimella, Mondal, Ved 
and Sheikh 2015a: 164; George, Branchini and 
Portela 2015b; McCoy et al. 2012: 450) or are part 
of broader movements for democratisation and 
wider political reform (George et al. 2015a: 164). 
A number of recent reviews have summarised the 
field of health accountability and helpfully describe 
the state-of-the-art in terms of types of activities 
and broad categories of social accountability or 
transparency initiatives (Cleary, Molyneux and 
Gilson 2013; Molyneux, Atela, Angwenyi and 
Goodman 2012; Berlan and Shiffman 2012; 
Lodenstein, Dieleman, Gerretsen and Broerse 2016; 
McCoy et al. 2012; Asha et al. 2015a, 2015b; Flores 
2011). In the review below we classify initiatives 
according to a broad typology of approaches 
that has been emerging for some years in the 
wider accountability literature (see, for example, 
Joshi 2013b) (user-centred information access, 
complaint/grievance redress, citizen report 
cards, public hearings, community scorecards, 
community monitoring, participatory budgeting). 
Another review classifies such actions under 
dialogic and advocacy approaches, focusing on 
different stages of accountability processes (Table 2). 
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Steps in accountability Approach: dialogue Approach: advocacy
Information collection Facility co-management meetings
Monitoring in health centres/specific services
Scoring/evaluation in groups
Collection of user complaints
Large-scale surveys
Maternal death audits
Collection of testimonies
Presentation/
negotiation
Training of health providers
Joint problem analysis with providers and 
other stakeholders
Joint planning with providers and other 
stakeholders
Independent analysis – formulation of 
statements and claims
Radio broadcasting
Presentation in public hearings, 
demonstrations, protests, media reports
Follow-up/enforcement - Involvement in political or administrative 
parties
Other characteristics Initiator: community groups/committees
Locus: health facility
Target: frontline service providers
Initiator: civil society organisation (CSO)/
NGO
Locus: sub-national
Target: providers, policy-makers, politicians
Table 2 Dialogic and advocacy approaches to accountability
Source: Adapted from Lodenstein et al. 2016
1.4 Current critical issues in 
accountability 
The accountability literature has been expanding 
rapidly over the past decade, a development which 
some trace to the specific influence of the World 
Bank-inspired stream of initiatives identified by 
Joshi and Houtzager (2012). Of late, there have 
been several reviews within development studies 
that have either attempted a meta-analysis 
of impacts and /or have taken a more critical 
qualitative approach to assessing current issues 
(e.g. Gaventa and McGee 2013; Joshi 2013a; Joshi 
and Houtzager 2012). 
The most recent of these is by Fox (2015), which 
purposefully re-examined evidence covered by 
previous reviews with a view to understanding its 
unevenness and providing a finer-grained analysis 
of differences between approaches and their 
outcomes. Fox criticises the ‘import’ of deductive 
concepts from outside of the empirical field of 
social accountability, such as the principal–agent 
approach inherent in some of the World Bank-
inspired work (Ibid.: 352). From his analysis of 
empirical work and critical literature, he explores 
which characteristics of SAIs are associated with 
which degrees of effectiveness and impact, and 
lists 11 emergent analytical propositions that sum 
up the key current critical issues in this field. These 
are summarised in Box 2. 
Referring back to the three ‘traditions’ of social 
accountability described earlier, the third – 
participatory and ‘deeper’ democracy – is the 
subject of a rich literature within development 
studies, which has raised many critical 
perspectives. Here, a number of sources (Cooke 
and Kothari 2001; Falisse, Meessen, Ndayishimiye 
and Bossuyt 2012; Mosse 2001; Cornwall 2003) 
critique participatory approaches, highlighting that, 
unless used with care, they can at best reveal (and 
at worse reinforce) underlying local hierarchies 
of power in decision-making, aligned with local 
norms regarding social status, gender, ethnicity 
and caste. Such critiques apply equally, then, when 
extending participatory approaches to ‘community’ 
accountability struggles and, indeed, should lead 
to questioning any idea of ‘community’ as a single, 
homogenous identity in accountability initiatives.
Contemporary discourse on community participation 
in accountability argues that citizens should engage 
with the state as ‘makers and shapers’ of policies 
that affect their daily lives and locate themselves at 
the centre of accountability processes and targeted 
outcomes (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001). The 
problem with a wide variety of these approaches, 
however, is that although they emphasise citizen 
action, they tend to emerge through a number of 
external ‘initiatives’ and ‘interventions’, which can 
carry the same relationships of power as those 
made visible by the critiques of participation. 
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Box 2: Social accountability propositions for discussion
a. Information needs to be user-centred to empower
b. ‘Voice’ needs representation as well as aggregation
c. Recognise that voice can be constrained by the ‘fear factor’
d. Unpack accountability goals in terms of reactive versus preventive approaches
e. ‘Teeth’ for public accountability refers to the state’s capacity to respond to citizen voice – a process 
that includes both negative sanctions and proactive reforms
f. Bring vertical accountability back in
g. ‘Voice’ and ‘teeth’ need each other
h. Social accountability strategies need to address the ‘squeezing the balloon’ problem
i. As a result, civil society policy monitoring and advocacy needs vertical integration
j. ‘Sandwich strategies’ can shift power with state–society synergy
k. Because context matters, the subnational comparative method is necessary to capture variation
(Fox 2015: 352–6)
As noted earlier, the scholarly interest in 
accountability forms part of a recent tendency to 
document wider emergent forms of citizen action 
and community-driven development. Paying closer 
attention to such extant forms of citizen-led action is 
consistent with Fox’s (2015) enjoinder to distinguish 
‘tactical’ from longer term, more complex ’strategic’ 
approaches and recognise the greater chances of 
success of the latter. It is also consistent with Joshi 
and Houtzager’s proposal for ‘a conceptualization 
of social accountability that focuses on ongoing 
political engagement by social actors with the 
state as a part of a long-term pattern of interaction 
shaped both by historical forces and the current 
context’ (2012: 146). Such activities might include 
forms of long-term struggle over the spoils of the 
state and of growth by particular groups (see, for 
example, Srinivasan 2014 and Harriss-White 2003: 47 
for diverging views as to whether these benefits 
accrue to the elite or to poor people); they may also 
include populist politics (Ibid.) or forms of ‘rude 
accountability’ (Hossain 2010) and public shaming 
(Unsworth 2010). In this latter form, accountability 
may lack formal sanctions, but tactics such as public 
shaming of providers can impose reputational and 
political costs, in some cases triggering formal 
accountability mechanisms – for instance, through 
the courts or an ombudsman’s office. 
1.5 The importance of context
Many studies on the effectiveness and impact of 
SAIs have emphasised the criticality of context 
in their working, decrying as depoliticising and 
‘widget-like’ (Joshi and Houtzager 2012) the purely 
technocratic framings. Bukenya et al. (2012) and 
Gaventa and McGee (2013) highlight how context 
is central in determining actors, objectives, design, 
the way an intervention unfolds, and its ultimate 
impact. Building on this work, Grandvoinnet, Aslam 
and Raha (2015) posit that social accountability is 
shaped by the two institutional spheres of civil and 
political society and their interactions (state–society 
and intra-society), influenced by cultural norms, 
global factors and the prevailing political settlement 
(inter-elite relations). This is summed up in Figure 2.
Corbridge and colleagues’ work on accountability 
programmes for education and work-based relief 
in three Indian states (West Bengal, Jharkhand 
and Bihar) represents a significant conceptual and 
empirical contribution to this body of literature. 
It draws on related bodies of literature concerned 
with the everyday workings of the state as 
experienced by poor people, as well as wider concerns 
derived from the Foucauldian analytical framing of 
governmentality (i.e. the ways in which the state 
and other actors construct bodies of knowledge 
about their subjects – in this case, poor people – 
in order to exert administration and control).4 The 
authors locate these everyday ‘sightings’ of the 
state within the existing social and political relations 
that precede any programmatic conception 
and implementation. This is, to some extent, an 
extension of the concerns with context and process, 
but is more explicit in outlining how new initiatives 
only complicate the existing socio-political mix 
further, in ways that can be unexpected though 
not always negative in the long run (Corbridge, 
Williams, Srivastava and Véron 2005: 261–2). 
These contextual approaches to accountability 
fit, therefore, within a wider genre that considers 
how the everyday functioning of the government 
machinery is determined, not by impartial 
bureaucrats, but by the compulsions of local politics 
(Berenschot 2010; Witsoe 2012, 2011). Elected 
representatives, their brokers, political party 
leaders and workers determine people’s access to 
information on public services and programmes, 
their participation and benefits, and can even subvert 
programme objectives, sometimes defeating them 
altogether (Berenschot 2010; Corbridge et al. 2005; 
Sharma 2011; Witsoe 2012). In this respect, SAIs 
often take place, not in the absence of the ‘standard 
model’ of bureaucratic and political accountability, 
but among its ruins and/or in the gaps it leaves. 
A crucial part of understanding context is understanding 
the everyday personal accountabilities of clientelism 
and patronage. The barter of political support for 
direct individual profit is studied as ‘clientelism’ in 
political science and ‘patronage’ in anthropological 
and sociological literature. Early scholarship of 
clientelism emphasised direct, face to face 
interactions and transactions between the patron 
and client (Hicken 2011; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007; Piliavsky 2014). Later research recognised 
that democratic electoral competition, especially at 
the national level, scales up clientelist networks, 
introducing brokers and mediators between patron 
and client (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Yet, even 
extensive pyramidal hierarchies of brokerage rely 
on personal relationships between individuals – the 
4 Governmentality has famously been defined as concerned more with the governance of conduct rather than the conduct of 
governance (Dean 2010: 10).
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patron and high-level brokers, high- and low-level 
brokers, and then low-level brokers and clients 
(Hicken 2011).
The clientelist exchange is direct and conditional. 
In democratic systems, politicians target benefits to 
specific constituencies on ethnic, regional, religious, 
class or caste lines. In clientelist politics, voters vote 
only for those politicians who promise to benefit them 
individually (through private rather than public goods) 
or in groups (through club goods), while politicians 
seek to benefit only those voters who assure them of 
their vote. The main criterion for giving and receiving 
resources is political support, not just membership 
of the target constituency. Accordingly, politicians 
in clientelist linkages set up elaborate devices and 
mechanisms to monitor the voting behaviour of 
clients and to ensure their accountability. 
The political study of the links between elected 
representatives and their constituents tends 
to focus on their transactional nature, whereas 
a more anthropological approach stresses the 
relational aspect. Anthropological literature 
rejects the clientelist conception of ‘elections as 
auctions’ with millions of profit-seeking voters 
‘wielding the abacus of rational choice’, instead 
focusing on why the patronage relations take 
the form they do (Piliavsky 2014). Berenschot 
(2014, 2010) and Corbridge et al. (2005) 
find that voters want politicians who will do 
their work. Constituents often need political 
mediation to access public services and want 
representatives who will help them negotiate the 
local bureaucracy. Conceptualising the patron–
client linkage as a social relation, Piliavsky (2014) 
highlights that politicians as representatives 
stand for the interests of their constituents and 
consequently work for their benefit. Patronage, 
for her, is a social institution that ‘involves 
entitlements and obligations, which are politically 
constitutive in their own right, and which oblige 
politicians to understand, convey and respond 
to their constituents’ needs’. In contrast, Witsoe 
(2011) finds that in contexts of intense political 
competition between different social groups for 
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Figure 2 Contextual drivers framework
Source: Grandvoinnet et al. 2015: 119
State action
• Awareness of the issue
• Ability to resolve the issue
• Official attitude towards 
engaging with civil 
society demands or voice
• Intrinsic motivation 
driving action
• Incentives and costs 
linked to inaction for non-
elected officials
• Incentives and costs 
linked to inaction for 
elected officials
Citizen action
• Awareness of the issue
• Salience of the issue
• Intrinsic motivation
• Efficacy
• Capacity for collective 
action
• Costs of inaction
Citizen–state interface
Linked to the interface:
• Type of existing interface
• Awareness of the 
interface
• Credibility of interface
Linked to interlocution for 
interface:
• Existence of interlocutors
• Effectiveness of 
interlocutors in mediating 
citizens and state officials 
on the issue
Information
Linked to citizen and state 
action:
• Accessibility
• Framing of the infomation
• Trustworthiness
Linked to citizen–state 
engagement:
• Information on existence 
and accessibility of the 
interface
• Information that 
strengthens the credibility 
of the interface with key 
stakeholders (citizens and 
officials)
Civil mobilisation
• Existence of mobilisers
• Capacity of mobilisers 
(agents and organisations)
• Effectivness in mobilising 
citizens
• Effectivness in mobilising 
state officials
dominance over the state, the political leader is 
supported to attain power to ensure the control 
of a particular social group over the state. The 
politician, in turn, works for the social upliftment 
of ‘his/her’ people. Patronage here is conceived 
‘horizontally’: the patron and clients identify with 
each other such that the patron’s rise to power 
represents the clients’ ascent and vice versa. 
1.6 What are the lessons from 
the global literature for SAIs in 
health and nutrition?5
The preceding findings are largely drawn from 
several recent meta-reviews or synthetic reviews of 
the literature, and the themes summarised so far are 
therefore similarly broad. Notably, however, some of 
these reviews also contain specific findings from SAIs 
in the health and nutrition sectors, and we now focus 
on these in more detail. Fox’s meta-review of 25 ‘large 
n’ quantitative studies, for example, (2015: 350–1) 
includes two interventions with positive health impacts 
(lowered infant mortality via participatory budgeting in 
Brazil and improved health outcomes via participatory 
monitoring in Uganda – discussed in this section). 
Mansuri and Rao’s (2013) study of over a decade of 
World Bank-funded ‘community-driven development’ 
projects (which included a number of accountability 
initiatives) summarised some significant improvements 
in health outcomes, behaviours and service use.
Other studies have systematically reviewed the 
evidence on the impact of SAIs in health, in particular 
on:
• care quality for consumers (Berlan and Shiffman 
2012);
• the functioning of ‘peripheral health facilities’ 
(i.e. clinics, dispensaries, excluding hospitals 
and district facilities) (Molyneux et al. 2012); 
• health facility committees (McCoy et al. 2012);
• community monitoring (Flores 2011);
• contextual factors influencing health committees 
(George et al. 2015a);
• awareness-raising (of rights) and maternity care 
service use (George et al. 2015b);
• how resources, attitudes and culture influence 
the functioning of accountability mechanisms in 
primary health-care settings (Cleary et al. 2013). 
In several cases, the evidence on the impact of 
SAIs is found to be ‘weak’ (Berlan and Shiffman 
2012: 277; Molyneux et al. 2012: 552). This is 
often attributed to the lack of rigorous quantitative 
studies, though intervention design may also be an 
issue: one review found studies overwhelmingly 
reporting committee/group-based interventions 
(Ibid.; 19 out of 21 studies6). While noting this lack 
of rigorous quantitative evidence, authors also 
stress the need to move beyond the assumed 
‘gold standard’ approach to impact assessment – 
i.e. randomised controlled trials – given that 
longitudinal and qualitative studies are better for 
understanding how and why particular outcomes 
are being achieved in different situations (McCoy et 
al. 2012: 460). Mixed methods are also advocated 
to combine more rigorous assessment of the 
impacts with explanations of why such impacts were 
reached (Ibid.; see also Lodenstein et al. 2016: 3, 
arguing for a realist perspective). 
Several of the findings are consistent with the 
wider literature on social accountability. They 
include: the need to pay attention to user needs for 
appropriate information (rather than information 
for information’s sake) (Berlan and Shiffman 2012: 
278); the importance of not assuming community 
homogeneity (Molyneux et al. 2012: 552); the 
importance of political context (Ibid.: 553; McCoy 
et al. 2012: 458–9) and therefore of ensuring 
adequate representation of the community (George 
et al. 2015a: 162), including addressing economic 
barriers (McCoy et al. 2012: 457); understanding 
how interventions play out on the supply side in 
terms of ‘provider norms’ (Berlan and Shiffman 
2012: 277); and finding the right links to collective 
action, civil society and other institutions Ibid.: 
278; Molyneux et al. 2012: 552–3; McCoy et al. 
2012: 458; Lodenstein et al. 2016: 10). One of 
the studies (Berlan and Shiffman 2012: 276) 
highlights a critical characteristic of health provider 
accountability – ‘consumer power’. It observes that 
there are strong information asymmetries between 
health service providers and users, which prevent 
the latter from demanding accountability, based 
on market forces. The review stresses the need 
for accountability interventions to address these 
information and power asymmetries. Another study 
(McCoy et al. 2012) highlights how information 
5 This section is adapted from an earlier review in Ahmed, Feruglio and Nisbett (forthcoming 2017).
6 This appears to reflect the dominant choice of committee/group-based interventions for accountability approaches within the 
health sector (another two of the above reviews deal primarily with committees). Because of the lack of clear evidence, it cannot 
be concluded that this approach is therefore not effective in health contexts – but this weaker ‘gene pool’ of approaches within 
health does potentially limit the opportunities to learn from experimenting with a range of approaches in different contexts.
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asymmetry prevented an otherwise successful SAI 
from influencing the actual running of clinics.
Two reviews highlight the interaction of externally 
driven accountability mechanisms with internal 
bureaucratic functioning (Cleary et al. 2013); or the 
interaction between formal and informal forms of 
participation (McCoy et al. 2012: 450). Four reviews 
highlight relevant contextual factors in communities 
or among service providers – e.g. community and 
provider values and attitudes (Cleary et al. 2013; 
Lodenstein et al. 2016) – while considering wider 
issues of resources and capacities (Cleary et al. 2013; 
George et al. 2015a: 163; Lodenstein et al. 2016: 10; 
McCoy et al. 2012: 457); community awareness and 
scepticism towards initiatives (George et al. 2015a: 
161–2); and similar health provider perceptions 
and orientations towards initiatives and their wider 
incentives to serve communities. The latter include 
fear of negative sanctions and more positive incentives 
such as a sense of moral duty (Lodenstein et al. 2016). 
In addition to highlighting the difference between 
‘process impacts’ such as improved governance 
reforms and service quality outcomes, Joshi 
argues that in the case of SAIs in health, it is hard 
to separate positive outcomes that result from 
increased uptake from improvements caused 
by greater accountability in the service itself 
(Joshi 2013b: s32–337). This is not necessarily a 
negative outcome, but it does make it difficult to 
draw lessons that can inform the design of future 
approaches. Another study of accountability in São 
Paulo underlines these differences in showing how 
opportunities for social accountability may actually 
occur more naturally for health than for social 
services in some instances, reflecting the different 
institutional models that have been adopted. This 
is because service delivery in health requires 
physical points of contact between citizens and 
agents of the state, including local health posts 
and participatory councils, and coordinating bodies 
at local levels of government. Programmes such 
as cash transfer schemes, however, entail fewer 
physical or organisational contact points around 
which people can mobilise (Unsworth 2010). On the 
other hand, health service delivery – more broadly 
conceptualised as including public health and more 
preventive rather than purely curative services – is 
likely to suffer in contexts in which citizens and 
providers see it largely in terms of the logistics and 
receipt of medical products such as drugs. 
2. Summary findings from review of 
current social accountability practice 
in the health and nutrition sectors 
in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh
Having identified key issues and lessons from 
the global and South Asian literature on social 
accountability and the literature on accountability 
in the health and nutrition sectors, we now focus 
on current practice in the three South Asian 
countries of interest. Besides our review of the 
general social accountability literature and that 
pertaining to the health sector, we undertook 
a more focused review of health and nutrition 
accountability initiatives in India, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan.8 
Table 3 summarises the five types of social accountability 
initiative identified in our earlier review, and gives a 
brief description of the form, scope and experience 
with each, as well as highlighting relevant information 
sources. Further findings are summarised in the 
conclusion, section 5, and in the main report.9
7 Joshi’s broader argument here is that poor people often ‘opt out’ of health and education services when not provided adequately 
by the state – either by going to private/informal providers or by not using services at all.
8 See footnote 2 for a description of the methodology.
9 The main report, available at www.transformnutrition.org/2017/03/accountability-in-health-and-nutrition-in-south-asia/, 
includes a discussion of each of the five types of social accountability initiative encountered in the focused review.
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Table 3 Social accountability approaches in use in the health and nutrition sectors in India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh
Social 
accountability 
approach
Description Sources
Social audits and 
public hearings 
• Public expenditure on health and nutrition 
provision or service delivery outcomes 
are shared and discussed with community 
members in a public meeting
• Serve an information dissemination and 
transparency function and provide platform 
for community members’ voices in multi-
stakeholder forum
• Can act as direct, timely mechanism for voicing 
accountability claims, within a framework of 
rights or of redressing grievances 
• Frequently mentioned in literature on India and 
Bangladesh but scarce in literature on Pakistan 
Joshi 2013b; Papp, Gogoi and 
Campbell 2013; 
Ahuja 2014; WRA 2010;  
Lakha, Rajasekhar and Manjula 2015; 
DiCaprio 2012; Democracy Watch 2014
Community 
monitoring 
initiatives and 
committees
• Ongoing community oversight of service 
providers’ activities, used to establish and 
maintain community-defined performance 
standards
• Easily observable features used as indicators 
(e.g. staff attendance, physical quality of 
facilities, adherence to due procedures)
• Can bring ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ sides of 
accountability relationships together
• Can shed light on corruption among service 
providers and public officials 
• Usually done by committees intended to 
represent users, service providers and 
political representatives
Joshi 2013b; Barpanda, Afrin and Das 
2013; Johnston 2009; 
Mahmud 2007, 2009; 
Schurmann and Mahmud 2009; 
Thomas, Sarker, Khondker, Ahmed and 
Hossain 2003; 
Aziz, Bhuiya, Hanifi, Iqbal and Hoque 
2009; Houweling, Tripathy, Nair, Rath, 
Rath, Gope, Sinha, Looman, Costello 
and Prost 2013; Kalita and Mondal 
2012; Green 2011; Khan et al. 2013; 
Khan and Ahmad 2016
Citizen report 
cards
• User surveys of public service performance 
using availability, access, quality and 
reliability parameters, usually combined 
with advocacy and publicity efforts to exact 
accountability from state
• Pioneered in Bangalore, India, and now used 
extensively around the world
Ahmad 2008; Ampratwum, Armah-
Attoh and Agyei Ashon 2014; Browne 
2014; 
Wagle, Singh and Shah 2004; Pandey 
and Singh 2012; Shukla, Scott and 
Kakde 2011; Knox 2009; 
Resource Integration Centre 2015
Community 
scorecards
• Hybrid comprised of citizen report cards 
+ social audits; combine user feedback on 
service performance, provider self-assessment 
and user–provider interface meetings to 
discuss performance assessments and agree 
remedial actions
• Usually produce report based on primary 
or secondary data as input to community 
reflection on local service provision, 
sometimes including ranking of services 
provided in different communities
Babajanian 2014; Murty 2007; Misra 
2007; Resource Integration Centre 
2015;
Khan and Ahmad 2016
Budget tracking 
and advocacy
• Civil society actors track implementation of 
public budgets to understand use of public 
resources and identify leakages, lack of 
expenditure and other irregularities
Boydell and Keesbury 2014;
Public Affairs Foundation Bangalore, 
Sirker and Cosic 2007;
NGO Forum for Public Health and 
Freshwater Action Network South 
Asia, n.d.; Simavi 2015; Mishra 2014: 
Mohmand and Cheema 2007; Ahmad 
and Talib 2013; Kurosaki 2006
3. Mutual learning at accountability’s 
cutting edge: findings from an 
online consultation 
The third part of this project consisted of an online 
discussion to complement the literature review 
and attempt to capture some of the undocumented 
cutting edge thinking and practice from the 
field. Participants were selected via a variety of 
methods: membership of the partner network of 
the Community of Practitioners on Accountability 
and Social Action in Health (COPASAH); mention in 
the published and grey literature reviewed earlier; 
other local partners or recommended participants; 
and ‘snowballed’ invitations.10 
The discussion centred on four topics as 
summarised here. The topics were pre-selected 
by the partners leading the consultation (IDS and 
COPASAH), based on their engagement with the 
literature and practice review and on some prior 
consultation with participants. In some cases the 
topics broadened in the course of the discussion. 
This is reflected in the present write-up, where 
the length of each topical section reflects both 
the different degrees of engagement on different 
themes, and the degree of broadening of or 
exploration around the topic initially set.
3.1 Community participation 
and engagement
This discussion started by focusing on the 
question: 
• How do organisations on the ground ensure 
that community members are engaged and 
lead social accountability efforts?
Participants illustrated how all social accountability 
processes begin with raising awareness and 
informing community members of their rights and 
entitlements. This step entails building a ‘culture of 
questioning’ that is crucial to mobilise communities 
around issues of health care and basic services. In 
this sense, a rights-based approach provides the 
framework for social action. The awareness-raising 
aspect is not limited to specific rights and 
entitlements, but includes building awareness on 
wider social and policy structures, the role of 
democracy, and the way the state functions. 
Some organisations engage with frontline service 
providers during this stage, both to fill the 
‘knowledge gap’ among health providers and to 
ensure shared goals and vision, thus reducing the 
risk of tensions between community members and 
frontline workers. 
Community participation can deploy a range of 
tools. Participants mentioned the full range of 
activities noted in the earlier literature review 
(community scorecards, social audits, etc.). 
Beyond more ‘traditional’ tools like scorecards, 
organisations also mentioned innovative uses of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
(see page 21) and pictorial materials/flashcards as 
ways to ensure inclusion of illiterate people.
During capacity-building workshops, picture 
materials depict the problems to start discussion 
and then explain entitlements. Women’s group 
leaders use these flashcards to inform other 
women during local village meetings. The 
illustrations are simplified as tools and checklists 
to enable the women’s groups to monitor those 
entitlements. Women learned which services 
should be provided in the Anganwadis11 of their 
villages through a set of picture cards. They 
used a ten-point checklist to monitor Anganwadi 
centres, and conduct neighbourhood surveys.
10 The consultation, hosted on the Eldis community discussion platform (www.eldis.org), was eventually attended by 49 
participants across India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the UK, the USA and the Netherlands. The discussion took place on 16–17 
March 2016. Over the two days, 31 participants posted contributions to the discussion (five of whom were from the organising 
team) for a total of 134 contributions.
11 Anganwadis are local-level delivery units in Indian villages, providing basic health care, including contraceptive counselling 
and supply, nutrition education and supplementation and pre-school activities. They were started by the Indian government 
in 1975 as part of the Integrated Child Development Services programme to combat child hunger and malnutrition.
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Participants were keen to underline that the 
effectiveness of social accountability tools does 
not depend on the type of tool chosen, but 
on the strategy built around it: ‘tools are just 
medium to create environment in the community 
so that people can sit together and start talking 
about the issues’. Experience on the ground 
has shown that while negotiating with service 
providers, the leverage that a given tool can open 
up for communities is context-specific. However, 
the choice of tool is often a pragmatic decision 
driven by the type of data that needs to be 
collected (or at times also influenced by funder 
requirements).
The discussion then shifted to the factors 
affecting people’s participation within social 
accountability processes. Motivation, incentives 
and social recognition are vital to ensure 
the participation of community members. 
Equally important is setting clear, reachable 
goals. However, questions arise with regard 
to sustainability and ‘institutionalisation’ of 
accountability processes.
When committee members accompany the 
patients to local health centres they receive 
recognition from the health system as 
‘VHWSC [village health, water and sanitation 
committee] members’ and this motivates them 
to work more. In a primary meeting place 
of the village, the names of the committee 
members were written on the walls, which 
also brought recognition to them among the 
community, which is another motivating factor. 
The big trigger was when the community-
led monitoring exercise started. Other than 
committee members, many of the villagers got 
interest into the accountability process and 
showed their willingness to join the group.
Practitioners underlined how, during the 
community participation process, attention needs 
to be paid towards inclusion of marginalised 
people. For instance, raising women’s voices, 
especially with regard to sexual and reproductive 
health and rights, is particularly challenging in 
contexts where gender, caste and religion hinder 
people’s participation (including their ability to 
attend community meetings). It can also affect 
their ability to address such issues as family 
planning. Here, social accountability processes 
can have broader uses in resisting oppression and 
ensuring representation of vulnerable groups. 
Some organisations address intra-community 
divisions by ensuring that each group within 
the community can participate in community 
monitoring and present their needs and views 
on the state of health care delivery. In the case 
of some women’s groups, solidarity and inter-
community support is essential to collectivise 
actions, and give the group a stronger voice. 
[W]omen support each other in the group 
meetings, they listen to each other’s problems, 
emotions, mishaps, threats, etc. and show 
solidarity for it. Then they try to identify the 
reasons behind these problems and make a 
collective plan of action against the issues. Most 
of the family issues (i.e. domestic violence, their 
mobility, etc.) are resolved by the group itself 
but for other issues (i.e. entitlements/schemes 
by the government), trained women motivate 
other women to negotiate their rights with 
service providers and become active claimants 
from passive beneficiaries.
In addition, community participation processes 
can provide a valuable opportunity to engage men 
in conversations about health care, particularly 
family planning, and in turn counter those gender 
dynamics that affect women negatively. 
If communities can demand accountability 
from the state, they also have to look 
within and address gender inequality 
in that domain – this requires giving up 
privilege, which is no doubt a challenge, 
but necessary. In interventions like these 
where we want the community to reflect on 
both aspects, we always lay the foundation 
with an understanding of gender/caste/
class inequalities, before speaking about 
entitlements. Secondly, with respect to 
family planning, we find that in addition to 
speaking to women about their right to use 
contraceptives, it is equally important to talk 
about family planning entitlements (from the 
state).
3.2 Negotiating with the state
In the standard process outlined by several of the 
participants, the next stage of an accountability 
initiative often involves data collected through 
community monitoring being presented to, and 
discussed with, government health providers at 
different levels. Therefore, the next question we 
focused on was this:
• How are community members involved in 
negotiating with the state?
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Most of the participants indicated that the 
negotiation at a local level happens through 
existing committees or ad hoc platforms set up 
by local groups. Some of these committees are 
established under government schemes (such 
as the village health and nutrition committees 
in India), but become properly functioning only 
through SAIs. In other instances, new platforms 
or opportunities for dialogue need to be created 
ad hoc. In some cases, local service providers 
participate in the monitoring process alongside 
community members and provide their own 
data.
Some participants mix collaborative and 
confrontational approaches when dealing 
with health providers. More confrontational 
approaches, including dharnas (non-violent 
sit-in protests) and litigation, are resorted to 
in particularly serious cases of health rights 
violations, or to advance strategic claims. 
It was pointed out that negotiation is usually 
easier at community level, where frontline 
workers and patients live side by side and find 
ways to collaborate. It becomes more difficult 
at higher levels, because of the difficulty of 
translating local demands into wider changes. 
Here, an essential step is the aggregation and 
analysis of information collected at community 
level. These data are brought to the attention 
of district or province/state-level discussion 
forums between civil society and government 
representatives. In participants’ experience, when 
locally collected data are used to push for better 
service delivery at ‘higher’ levels (such as district 
or state), community members are seen as 
legitimate sources of information, and their voices 
become legitimate ingredients in decision-making 
processes. 
Lastly, there are some good examples of ‘vertical 
integration’ and continuous exchanges between 
various administrative levels (community and 
district/state) in the work some participants 
have been doing on health budgets. Budgetary 
considerations are essential when advocating for 
improvements in health service delivery. Some 
of the participants’ work focuses on unpacking 
public health budgets, and facilitating community 
input on budget allocations. Here, the community 
participation process can lead to the formulation 
of ‘key asks’ for the government. This approach 
has led to cases where the state actually initiates 
consultations with communities during the 
formulation of budgets.
3.3 Accountability of the 
private sector
When speaking about ensuring accountability in 
the delivery of health care, many participants saw 
the private sector as a crucial piece of the picture. 
Key questions are:
• What are the different ways of promoting 
accountability of private providers?
• What should be done when patient rights 
are violated through private sector actions?
• What are the ways of ensuring rational and 
ethical practice that has the potential to 
safeguard patients’ rights?
Regulation of the private health sector was 
seen as a critical and urgent task. Lack of 
regulation can result in the lack of an effective 
framework for claiming accountability in 
service delivery. Moreover, the relations 
between patients and private providers are of 
an economic nature, and do not follow the 
paradigm of rights and duties. 
With the exception of one example from Pakistan, 
in most of the contexts where participants work, 
there is a lack of effective channels for dialogue 
and grievance redressal. Participants felt therefore 
that accountability can only be realised by 
reaffirming the role of the government as having 
primary responsibility for health-care provision 
and regulation. This agenda must essentially be 
pushed at policy level.
However, these decision-making spaces and 
processes were felt to be neither transparent nor 
accountable to the principle of ensuring access to 
quality health care for all. 
3.4 Defining and measuring 
impact, and issues around 
monitoring and evaluation
Participants were encouraged to share their 
thoughts on the following questions:
• How do standard ways of understanding the 
impact of social accountability initiatives look, 
when viewed from community members’ and 
practitioners’ perspectives? 
• What roles can community members play in 
monitoring change? 
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During the first day of discussion, it emerged that 
the first and foremost focus of social accountability 
processes is to build capacity and awareness 
of community members to demand their rights. 
However, even if community members become 
more empowered, access to services may not 
necessarily improve. Indeed, service uptake 
depends on a number of other factors, such as the 
quality and acceptability of the service and the 
capacity of service providers to deliver health care. 
Therefore, there seems to be an excessive focus on 
service uptake as a standard indicator to measure 
impact of social accountability. 
[I]mplementers of social accountability as 
well as those who study them, tend to look 
at improvement in services and increase in 
uptake as indicators of effectiveness of social 
accountability [initiatives]. But is this really 
sufficient? The dynamics illustrated [in the 
consultation] show an empowered community 
constantly negotiating and asserting its rights, 
while services per se may not be improving. Is 
this not a marker of change? 
This is strongly linked with the question of for whom 
the practitioners are carrying out the monitoring 
or evaluation of health provision. Participants 
agreed that evaluations are mostly carried out for 
funders, and therefore tend to be framed by project 
commitments and narrow indicators focused 
largely on service uptake and use. Participants felt 
that mainstream approaches to evaluation do not 
consider the many other forms of social change 
– beyond increased access to services – that can 
result from social accountability processes, such 
as empowerment. Narrow approaches also fail to 
grasp the complexities surrounding community 
choices over service access and usage. 
Participants shared examples of recent efforts 
by civil society and researchers to counter this 
‘technocratic’ approach to impact assessment, 
pointing out some resource materials produced 
on this issue (Das 2015). For instance, ‘stories 
of change’ have been identified as a promising 
method to document ‘how’ and ‘why’ change is 
created rather than just ‘what’ the change is.
Participants then discussed the role of community 
members in monitoring change. Here, a couple 
of posts discussed the use of ICTs for gathering 
data, ranging from short message service (SMS) to 
interactive voice recording (IVR) and multimedia 
(photo and videos). Overall, participants strongly 
highlighted how the scope of technologies to 
enable anonymous participation can increase the 
participation of community members, especially 
women. Patients feel comfortable reporting 
corruption in health facilities through the use of 
SMS or IVR because they do not fear retaliation 
from health staff. An additional bonus of using 
technologies to collect data is that it increases 
the perceived validity of the data on the part of 
government authorities. 
3.5 Wrapping up the 
discussion: the need to 
politicise social accountability
Final remarks focused on situating existing SAIs 
for health and nutrition within wider pushes 
for social change. Participants were asked how 
localised community-level actions make sense 
of their goals in the long run, and how they form 
alliances with each other. It was felt that local-
level initiatives need to link up and synchronise 
with wider movements to pursue long-term goals 
of addressing supply-side barriers and influencing 
policy-making. Attempts to change power dynamics 
at local levels need to reflect on wider political 
structures. 
A classic example of an (initially) localised demand 
for accountability, which then translated into wider 
political change, is the Right to Information / Right 
to Food movement in India (see case study on page 
27). A more recent and smaller-scale example 
comes from the state of Assam, where efforts to 
expose gaps in the delivery of maternal and infant 
health services for tea workers have allied with a 
state-wide campaign calling for increased wages 
across the tea industry (Dhital and Feruglio 2016; 
The Times of India 2015).
To sum up the rich contributions of participants 
over the two days of online discussion, we can 
say that the main message might be that putting 
politics and power at the core of the accountability 
discourse is essential to ‘make sense’ of the 
change we seek to create, and any attempt to 
understand impact should take into account these 
considerations.
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 4. Case studies
4.1 Case study 1: 
Multi-dimensional movements 
in social accountability – the 
Right to Food movement (India) 
Introduction
The Right to Food (RtF) movement in India took a 
multi-stranded and strategic approach, drawing 
together several stakeholders at local and state 
levels of governance with civil society and activist 
communities to enact several accountability 
mechanisms, both formal and social (Hertel 2015). 
The movement gathered momentum over the course 
of a series of Supreme Court orders on nutrition 
and food policy, and has also been characterised 
by ‘micro-level’ grassroots activities (Krishnan and 
Subramanian 2014). 
The RtF movement began in the early 2000s 
and contributed to the passing of the National 
Food Security Act in 2014 as well as a number of 
other achievements. Along with linked and similar 
campaigns for transparency (Right to Information) 
and public works-based social protection (the 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act 2005), the RtF movement exemplifies 
how a combination of public pressure (from social 
mobilisation and the media) and Supreme Court 
interventions can instigate formal accountability 
mechanisms (Khera 2013; Pande 2008). 
The importance of social mobilisation through 
generating awareness of rights and via various 
forms of public scrutiny enacted by communities 
has been highlighted by Dreze (2001) among 
others. At the community level, citizens can exert 
pressure through voice-based accountability 
practices and collective action. The key role of 
intermediaries such as CSOs, the judiciary and 
activists in catalysing processes of accountability 
at all levels of governance is highlighted in the 
case of the RtF movement (Pande 2008). Khera 
(2013) refers to these as the ‘non-party politics’ 
players and invokes the idea of combining ‘self-
assertion’ and ‘solidarity’ to enact social change 
and accountability (Dreze and Sen 2002). 
Background and legal action
The RtF campaign is based on an ‘informal national 
network’ of CSOs, academics and activists.12 
The movement was triggered in 2001 by a decade-
long Public Interest Litigation in the Supreme 
Court to petition the state to address inadequate 
drought and hunger relief in Rajasthan, despite 
the existence of nine nationwide government 
programmes on hunger prevention and food 
security (Khera 2013).13 While the Indian 
Constitution at the time did not explicitly guarantee 
a ‘right to food’, this was petitioned under the 
constitutional ‘right to life’. Despite the existence 
of state programmes to address hunger and 
malnutrition such as the Public Distribution Scheme 
(PDS) (a nationwide food subsidy scheme), they 
had failed in terms of local implementation and 
lacked operational accountability mechanisms 
(Saxena 2010). 
The RtF movement gathered pace and 
pursued legal recourse as a tool for holding 
state institutions accountable for wide-scale 
malnutrition, hunger and failed state food subsidy 
programming. By taking action at the local and 
national levels, the campaign was effective in 
securing legal accountability mechanisms from 
state institutions (Krishnan and Subramanian 
2014). The overall context of a democratic (and 
increasingly decentralised) system of governance 
facilitated a series of political opportunities for the 
campaign. Protest activities served to open ‘spaces 
for dialogue’ in the move towards accountability 
(Krishnan and Subramanian 2014: 109). 
The Supreme Court ruled ‘right to food’ as a legal 
entitlement, thus making state institutions formally 
accountable. This ruling converted ‘state welfare 
measures into legal rights’, therefore easing the 
way for demand and public action in local and state 
contexts (Krishnan and Subramanian 2014: 110). 
In 2002, an order was issued mandating states to 
refrain from diverting central funds meant for food 
and employment schemes to other purposes. The 
gram sabha (village councils) were authorised to 
conduct social audits of all schemes implemented 
in their local areas. 
12 Definition drawn from the Right to Food campaign website, http://www.righttofoodcampaign.in
13 The case was brought about by the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (in Rajasthan) versus the Union of India and others, 
Civil Writ Petition 196/2001
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Commissioners were appointed by the Supreme 
Court to monitor the implementation of these 
schemes; their report confirmed the shortcomings 
in state delivery of the PDS. However, both the 
public and the commissioners’ investigation teams 
were consistently denied access to documents 
linked with food and employment schemes and 
a series of bureaucratic hurdles signified a lack 
of political will. In 2003, the Supreme Court 
converted existing directives concerning famine 
and hunger management into binding codes for 
state-level governments to follow. This provided 
enforceability and sanction powers to state 
governments – including, for example, the ability 
to cancel the licences of grain shop owners 
(operating under the PDS) if they did not open 
on time or made false entries on beneficiary 
entitlement amounts. Action was also taken against 
certain states that had failed to implement the 
government’s Midday Meal Scheme in schools, and 
the programme was made mandatory at a national 
level (Mahabal 2004). 
Against this background of legal activity, the 
RtF movement emerged with a coherent goal 
of realising the core right for Indians to be free 
from hunger and malnutrition. Achieving this goal 
required a holistic approach that incorporated 
sustainable and equitable food security systems 
but also guaranteed rights to work, land and 
social security (Mahabal 2004). Eventually the 
RtF movement brought together their goals to 
call for a rights-based social welfare system for 
vulnerable groups. 
Accountability tools
The RtF was catalysed through legal mechanisms 
and mobilisation of communities and organisations 
at a national scale. These played out in multi-level 
dynamics at state, local and nationwide levels to 
enable a widespread and escalating movement. 
In addition to deploying existing legal 
accountability mechanisms at the state and 
national levels of governance, the RtF movement 
can be seen as a series of scattered actions 
taking place across India using more informal 
and grassroots-based accountability tools. Social 
audits, public hearings and community monitoring 
were among the key tools used in the movement 
(Hertal 2014). The citizen-led accountability 
tactics could be conceived as a combination 
of both ‘confrontational’ and ‘collaborative’ 
actions (Krishnan and Subramanian 2014: 106). 
The role of the media and CSOs (and individual 
activists and academics) in mediating social 
mobilisation was also central to the enactment of 
accountability processes in the RtF movement. 
One example of an approach that combined both 
‘confrontational’ and ‘collaborative’ tactics is 
from Delhi, where public hearings were organised 
by a local citizen group Parivatan to expose 
corruption among officials involved in the PDS 
(Pande 2008). This case shows how the existing 
Right to Information legal mechanism was used 
to voice calls for transparency and accountability 
in providing grains to beneficiaries according to 
their entitlements under the PDS. The campaign 
began with individual cases of beneficiaries 
who had not received their correct entitlements 
petitioning for the Right to Information with the 
help of Parivatan. Such moves gathered momentum 
through social mobilisation, the attention of the 
media and response from state governments. 
Public hearings (or jan sunwais) were held as the 
final part of a strategy where information that 
had been collectively gathered and analysed was 
presented to the public and verified. The public 
hearings involved government and community 
members and were overseen by an independent 
committee, exemplifying the collaborative aspect of 
the approach (Pande 2008). 
Despite attempts at reprisal from targeted public 
officials, including violent attacks on the members 
of Parivatan, the movement escalated quickly and 
the state responded: public scrutiny processes 
were introduced in several areas of Delhi; the 
public could access food grain records and air 
grievances on a twice-monthly basis. The supply of 
food was also scaled up in areas where Parivatan 
had campaigned. While the movement did not lead 
to a transformation of the entire system in Delhi, 
it demonstrates how direct actions can enable 
citizen groups to enter into negotiations with 
the state and how two separate movements (for 
transparent information and food security in this 
case) can be linked in accountability approaches 
(Pande 2008). 
An example of a state-wide movement to guarantee 
nutrition and maternal health-care as a result 
of the RtF movement is also provided by the 
Mitanin programme in Chhattisgarh (Krishnan 
and Subramanian 2014). The Mitanin model is an 
example of a grassroots primary health-care model 
with inbuilt community accountability mechanisms. 
The model provided key primary health services 
(such as weighing children in a village and 
collecting nutrition data) and effectively created a 
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‘social safety net’ for women and children (Nandi 
and Schneider 2014).
Mitanin workers were found to be both ‘agents of 
change’ within the community and representative 
advocates for accountability to the community 
(Nandi and Schneider 2014). The effectiveness 
of the model has been attributed to the fact 
that accountability was linked to the community 
rather than to a government department. 
The community health workers were unpaid, 
which could also reinforce autonomy, although 
Nandi and Schneider question the structures 
of payment in determining accountability 
outcomes. 
Finally, an example of a movement under the 
RtF banner on a nationwide scale: the Supreme 
Court orders regarding the Midday Meal Scheme 
were used as a platform to urge state-driven 
reform. Activists under the RtF movement 
mobilised the media and were able to use a 
combination of public pressure and legal orders 
to bring about nationwide implementation of a 
scheme that guarantees one cooked meal per day 
for school-going children (Khera 2013).
4.2 Case study 2: 
Naripokkho – from community 
activism and accountability 
to state-level action on 
women’s rights and 
development in Bangladesh 
Naripokkho (meaning pro-women) is a 
membership-based activist organisation that 
strives for women’s rights and development 
in Bangladesh. Its efforts are focused on four 
themes: (a) violence against women and human 
rights; (b) reproductive rights and women’s 
health; (c) gender issues in the environment 
and development; and (d) representation of 
women in media and cultural politics (Azim 
2001). Naripokkho works in all 64 districts of 
Bangladesh through partnerships and networks. 
It has built, supported and strengthened 37 
community-based organisations in 29 districts 
to work directly with women on reproductive 
rights and health and issues of violence. It 
has also partnered with Doorbar, a women’s 
network that focuses on preventing violence 
against women and enabling their political 
empowerment. 
Naripokkho’s work in the area of women’s 
reproductive rights and health has included 
activism and advocacy against target-oriented 
and coercive population control policies 
and programmes as well as the rights of sex 
workers. In the late 1990s, it expanded its 
focus to the quality of public health services 
available to women and, in collaboration with 
the government and district hospitals, sought to 
make public hospitals more accessible to women. 
This experience highlighted the criticality of 
accountability in ensuring that women patients 
received the services they needed. 
In 2003, Naripokkho began an initiative on 
community monitoring of maternal health 
services in five districts and 14 sub-districts of 
southern Bangladesh in partnership with 16 local 
women’s NGOs. This initiative worked through 
multiple levels – from the village to the state – to 
strengthen health system accountability. At the 
village level, it set up women’s groups or Nari 
Dals to create awareness about health rights and 
entitlements and demand quality health services 
from public facilities. Nari Dal members protested 
instances of rent-seeking and denial of services 
by health service providers through confrontation, 
argument and shouting slogans. They also 
conducted regular monitoring visits to their local 
union health and family welfare centres. Their 
awareness of entitlements and group strength 
forced the health system to respond to their 
demands. 
At the district and sub-district levels, the 16 
NGO partners each monitored a health centre 
for cleanliness, staff attendance and staff 
behaviour towards women patients, sharing their 
observations with the hospital management 
committee of the facility and at the district and 
sub-district-level NGO coordination committee 
meetings. Their intervention led to improvements 
in the cleanliness of facilities, ambulance 
availability, power supply, number of patient 
beds, and reduced rent-seeking. Naripokkho and 
its partners also worked to activate the largely 
non-functional hospital management committees, 
which every public hospital is expected to have. 
Chaired by the local Member of Parliament (MP) 
and including stakeholder representatives such 
as hospital employees, health department and 
local government officials as well as civil society 
members, this committee has the ability to 
identify and solve local problems. Activating these 
committees involved convincing MPs to convene 
meetings and members to attend the same. 
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Active hospital management committees were 
effective in reducing private practice by doctors 
during hospital hours, and reducing rent-seeking, 
as well as improving the quality of inpatient 
meals (Barpanda et al. 2013).
In the area of violence against women, 
Naripokkho’s accountability focus translated 
into monitoring of state interventions to combat 
such violence. Begun in 1999 as part of their 
campaign against acid violence, initially this 
included regular monitoring of 22 police stations 
in the Dhaka metropolitan area, the emergency, 
gynaecology, burns and forensic medicine 
departments of two major public hospitals and 
the special court for all cases of violence against 
women (COPASAH no date; Huq 2003). Gradually, 
Naripokkho activists negotiated with the police 
to set up regular reporting of violence against 
women incidents and follow-up action from all 
460 police stations in the country. In this way, 
a special cell for monitoring violence against 
women was set up in Dhaka police headquarters 
(UNIFEM 2003). 
The objective of all such monitoring was to 
identify loopholes in the system and report back 
to the relevant agencies for action. Quarterly 
meetings were organised with all service 
providers and the findings of the monitoring 
presented as action research in a ‘spirit of 
dialogue’ (Huq 2003). The resulting discussion 
led to explanations and a self-review by officials 
with representatives from the agencies and 
Naripokkho jointly preparing recommendations 
for action (UNIFEM 2003). Huq (2003) 
highlighted that while most service providers 
identified lack of resources as a major problem, 
Naripokkho emphasised the role of the behaviour 
and attitudes of staff providing services, which 
many survivors of violence had highlighted. For 
instance, male doctors’ attitudes and behaviour 
towards victims led to high rates of refusal for 
post-rape examinations. After Naripokkho’s 
intervention, the rate of refusal fell significantly 
(UNIFEM 2003). Huq (2003) clarified that such 
constructive engagement was possible because 
of an understanding that Naripokkho would 
not publicise or release the findings of their 
monitoring to the media or public.
Nazneen and Sultan (2010) highlighted the 
role of personal networks in Naripokkho’s 
negotiations with the state, like several other 
women’s organisations in Bangladesh. According 
to them, Naripokkho relied on personal 
connections to obtain permission, overcome 
resistance and manage disagreements while 
monitoring state interventions. They consciously 
avoided engaging with any political party 
because of the partisan nature of Bangladesh 
politics, striving hard to maintain a neutral stance 
and fighting off any labels applied from time 
to time. Local politicians were approached for 
redressal of specific issues in their constituencies 
but there was no engagement with national-level 
political parties.
Naripokkho’s success in other domains, including 
its well-publicised role in the setting up of the 
Acid Survivors Foundation to support victims 
of domestic and sexual violence, has received 
criticism for aligning itself too well with global 
donor priorities and approaches rather than 
the physical and structural violence of gender 
inequities as experienced by Bangladeshi women 
wholesale (i.e. beyond high-profile attacks on 
young women; Chowdhury 2011). However, 
this needs to be countered by Naripokkho’s 
own stated approach to support affected young 
women to move from being victims to activists 
working against acid violence (Nazneen and 
Sultan 2010) alongside their wider rights-based 
activism; attention to addressing structural 
inequities in services such as health; and their 
willingness to take on government and donor 
policies (such as coercive population control) 
directly. 
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5. Conclusion
The cases highlighted, both in the literature reviews 
and the online consultation, show that there are 
a range of approaches taken or ‘tools’ employed 
to strengthen accountability, including social 
audits, community scorecards, user committees, 
community report cards and expenditure tracking. 
The consultation in particular raised some new 
possibilities and innovations stemming from the use 
of ICTs directed towards a range of accountability 
goals, from awareness-raising to real-time user 
monitoring of service quality and grievance 
redressal. By way of a conclusion, we present here 
the most salient considerations arising from our 
overarching analysis of the material. We frame 
these as wider themes that emerge from the rich 
insights the material offers on community-level 
and intra-community accountability dynamics, 
and which are pertinent to broader accountability 
debates. 
Community
The first set of considerations surround assumptions 
about community itself. Drawing from the 
literatures and practices discussed in this report 
– including earlier critiques of participation, wider 
synthetic or critical work on accountability and 
the wider literature on the embeddedness of the 
state in extant social and political structures – we 
note that no assumptions should be made about 
the community as a single, homogenous entity 
expressing any awareness or desire towards levels 
of service provision and service quality for health 
and nutrition. Different parts of the community will 
serve their own needs through government and 
other private sector provision to varying extents 
or not at all. One section of the community might 
not welcome another section securing increased 
access to a given service, and both this existing 
service provision and likely disputes over future 
provision are likely to occur along existing fault 
lines of social exclusion relating to caste, ethnicity, 
age, gender, sexuality, (dis)ability and so on. This 
understanding of community also precludes ready 
divisions between ‘the community’ and ‘service 
providers’. Frontline workers and low- or mid-level 
bureaucrats serving communities will be drawn 
from various parts of the community or different 
communities. Their identity (e.g. caste or kinship) 
may also affect the level of service they are willing 
to (or feel obliged to) provide.
The literature on Pakistan, India and Bangladesh 
highlights familiar themes of the dangers of 
exclusion or elite capture occurring in health and 
nutrition or related programmes (e.g. DiCaprio 
2012; Green 2011; Resource Integration Centre 
2015) as well as the fact that committee selection 
may be biased towards those members of the 
community already most engaged in similar 
activities (Mahmud 2007, 2009). However, 
other studies reveal that careful planning and 
consideration of community contexts – and 
paying careful attention to inclusion – can 
have positive results (Papp et al. 2013). The 
practitioner consultation highlighted similar issues 
with inclusion, recognising the need to listen to 
particular voices – especially (but not exclusively) 
women’s voices – whether via general mobilisation 
or specific and separate consultation with groups 
who are unlikely to otherwise be given a voice. The 
consultation also stressed the need to mobilise 
and sensitise communities around specific issues – 
something that resonates with the wider literature 
on the need to highlight the less visible and 
lower-profile community issues such as chronic 
undernutrition, for example (Gillespie, Haddad, 
Mannar, Menon and Nisbett 2013).
Collective action and coercion
The second set of considerations focus on 
collective action and coercion,14 by which we 
mean the actions of individuals and groups 
operating to demand, incentivise and coerce action 
from service providers. As already flagged here, it 
has long been a contention in the accountability 
literature that overly technocratic interventions 
tend to ignore, not only local politics, but also 
any potential for translating community voice, 
demands and action into wider change. People 
coming together collectively to demand action 
or rights has been associated with successful 
advocacy for better services – sometimes in 
14 We apply the term ‘coercion’ to refer to the way in which the community might coerce provision from reluctant service 
providers. However, we note that the term has also been employed in the wider literature to refer to the way that communities 
might be coerced by higher status / more powerful state employees (McCoy et al. 2012: 450).
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conjunction with, but at other times without the 
aid of, accountability initiatives (Gaventa and 
Barrett 2010). But there are also many other 
low-level instances of coercion between 
community members and service providers 
(including ‘rude accountability’, Hossain 2010), 
which may realise dividends in terms of provision 
of services, but which are not always preceded by 
larger scale collective action.
In the cases reviewed or noted within the 
consultation, collective action was highlighted 
sometimes as a deliberate result of the design 
of a particular SAI (e.g. Democracy Watch 2014) 
and sometimes as a result of community-level 
accountability activities that were able to 
leverage or ‘piggyback’ on existing collectives 
or rights-based movements. One useful example 
reveals how participation in collective action 
(e.g. Mahmud 2009) can be dependent on 
participants’ backgrounds, with the types of 
collaborative dialogue described in this section 
an option for some, while ‘noisy protest’ is an 
alternative for those groups who feel less able to 
engage in constructive dialogue (whether due to 
social position and /or lack of education). Others, 
however, have noted that this inability to engage 
formally can still limit effectiveness (Thomas et al. 
2003). The practitioner consultation confirmed 
this range of engagement options available and 
provided further examples of ways in which 
people might shout louder (e.g. dharnas) on 
the one hand, or pursue litigation on the other, 
in order to coerce a response. The consultation 
highlighted how choice of action might depend 
on both formal and informal styles or registers of 
communication but also whether the action aims 
to secure change at the local or national level. 
Participants highlighted the need for multi-level 
action or ‘vertical integration’ between actions at 
the various administrative levels of government, 
from village to district to state. The two extended 
case studies in section 4 (Right to Food in India 
and Naripokkho in Bangladesh) provide useful 
examples of community accountability joining 
with wider civic and legal action and national-level 
political movements to pursue effective change 
simultaneously at these multiple levels. 
Cooperation, capacity and 
commitment
The third set of considerations is to do with 
cooperation, capacity and commitment. 
Successful interventions usually involve work on 
both sides of the supply and demand divide. 
The capacity of community-based frontline 
workers to meet any ‘demand-side’ expectations 
that emerge from extant or interventionist 
accountability actions at the community level 
is also a factor that shapes outcomes. But the 
capacity and commitment of local political actors 
to ‘forge and maintain synergistic relations with 
different social actors’ (vom Hau 2012, cited in 
Bukenya et al. 2012: 47) is also relevant, as is 
the ability of individuals or particular community 
groups to shape these same interests around 
their own. The notion of commitment denotes the 
fact that service providers need to champion – or 
be prepared to respond to others’ championing 
of – particular aspects of services that require 
improvement or have yet to be delivered at all (a 
frontline worker’s duty to make home visits, for 
example). This follows other concerns in the wider 
literature stressing the need for broader state 
responsiveness (Fox 2015: 353; see also Joshi 
2013b: s42–s43) and ‘sandwich strategies’ that 
place pincer pressure on such responsiveness from 
above and below (Fox 2015: 355–6).
We found many examples of the importance 
of bringing service providers into community 
mechanisms, including (for example) work cited 
from Bangladesh in terms of health centre and 
health provision monitoring (Barpanda et al. 2013; 
Johnston 2009; Mahmud 2007, 2009; Schurmann 
and Mahmud 2009); other examples involve mixed 
community–service provider committees (e.g. 
Green 2011); and several cited examples follow 
the community score approach, where this type 
of dialogue is a central part of the intervention 
philosophy. Likewise, in the cases cited by 
practitioners in the online consultation, deliberate 
involvement in accountability – rather than being a 
threat – has been part of the story of empowering 
frontline workers or lower-level functionaries to 
contribute to local movements for positive change. 
Online contributors highlighted cases where the 
presence of civil society was necessary to activate 
or harness more formal mechanisms, which had 
recently been built into government services. 
However, such institutionalisation of accountability 
has come with a loss of momentum, or of 
‘teeth’ (Fox 2015), in a number of cases already 
described, highlighting the very real concerns 
about co-option, including by health professional 
elites such as doctors (Mahmud 2009, 2007). 
Clientelism
The final set of considerations suggests that 
a reappraisal of clientelism or patronage is 
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in order in all the nuanced ways suggested by 
Box 2 and our preceding discussion. Clientelism 
therefore stands for all those further dimensions 
of interactions between existing community social 
relationships, agents of the state and political 
actors. This is not invoked to suggest a positive 
reappraisal of clientelism or patronage, but simply 
to imply that how these institutions function is 
critical to understanding how poor people and 
groups of poor people usually experience the 
everyday workings of the state prior to, during, 
and after the existence of an accountability 
intervention. We have seen here mentions of 
rent-seeking in clinical practice (Barpanda et al. 
2013; Mahmud 2007, Thomas et al. 2003) which 
begin to hint at such practices and the limits to 
accountability actions; or ‘co-option and collusion’ 
between those parts of local political structures 
coming into contact with social audits (Lakha et al. 
2015). Khan’s reports of the everyday politics of 
local and central government operating behind the 
failure of a significant project in Pakistan are also 
salutary in this regard (Khan 2013). 
Such references were fewer than we had 
expected. The wider health accountability 
literature we referenced earlier includes a 
revealing reference from Nepal, in which it is 
explained that, ‘While on paper the service was 
argued to be about the provision of patient care, 
in practice the service was seen to exist to pay 
salaries to workers irrespective of whether any 
care was provided’ (Cleary et al. 2013: 220; 
see also George 2009 for a further case in 
India). McCoy and colleagues provide several 
other examples ‘of local politics affecting the 
functioning of Health Facility Committees, 
especially in relation to local politicians or 
elites asserting control over committees for 
their own gain’ (2012: 458, citing cases from La 
Forgia 1985 (Panama); Ramiro et al. 2001 (the 
Philippines) and Soahani 2005 (Kenya). Other 
references in the wider literature highlight how, 
in some cases, processes of democratisation 
and decentralisation or wider legal reforms have 
served as a more positive national background 
against which local politics are then shaped, 
with positive examples from Kerala (George et 
al. 2015b: 164, citing a number of references 
including Heller et al. 2007, Elamon et al. 2004) 
and Brazil (George Ibid. citing Cornwall 2008).15 
5.1 A closing word
The fact that there were not more reports of such 
interaction of accountability approaches with real, 
messy, micro-politics may reflect the fact that some 
of the literature reviewed – particularly the grey 
literature – is written from a normative perspective 
advocating for greater accountability (see Gaventa 
and McGee 2013: s11), which may cloud reporting 
of failure and /or the messy everyday reality in 
which these cases occur. 
For similar reasons, in this project we have 
struggled to meet our ambition of providing 
further and more nuanced accounts of how 
external interventions might interact with existing 
political structures in ways that are not always 
anticipated by the originators of accountability 
interventions (as in the case of classic development 
ethnographies, including Corbridge et al. 2015). 
In future, a more nuanced assessment will be 
important in gaining a greater understanding of 
the factors that determine whether accountability 
initiatives succeed, fail, have unintended 
consequences and /or are sustained beyond 
external intervention and momentum.
15 Though notably, the wider evidence in both the Indian and Brazilian contexts – when balancing the opportunities posed by 
wider political reform with extant local politics – is actually also rather mixed.
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Making All Voices Count is a programme working towards a world in which open, effective and participatory 
governance is the norm and not the exception. It focuses global attention on creative and cutting edge 
solutions to transform the relationship between citizens and their governments. The programme is inspired 
by and supports the goals of the Open Government Partnership. 
Making All Voices Count is supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA) and the Omidyar Network, and is implemented by a consortium consisting of Hivos, IDS and Ushahidi.
Research, Evidence and Learning component
The programme’s Research, Evidence and Learning component, managed by IDS, contributes to improving 
performance and practice, and builds an evidence base in the field of citizen voice, government responsiveness, 
transparency and accountability (T&A) and technology for T&A (Tech4T&A).
Web www.makingallvoicescount.org
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Transform Nutrition is a consortium of five international research and development partners funded 
by the UK Department for International Development. Its aim is to transform how people think about 
nutrition and how they act to improve it in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa – the two regions with the 
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information see www.transformnutrition.org
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